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Response to Elqayam, Nottelmann, Peels and Vahid on my Paper “Epistemic 
Poverty, Internalism, and Justified Belief” 1 
Robert Lockie, University of West London 
 
Abstract 
 
I here respond to four SERRC commentators on my paper 
‘Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty’: Shira Elqayam, 
Nikolaj Nottelmann, Rik Peels and Hamid Vahid. I maintain that all 
accounts of epistemic justification must be constrained by two limit 
positions which have to be avoided. One is Conceptual Limit 
Panglossianism (an excessively subjective, ‘emic’, ‘bounded’ and 
‘grounded’, relativistic perspectivism, whereby anything the epistemic 
agent takes to be justified, is). The other is Conceptual Limit Meliorism 
(an excessively objective, ‘etic’, ‘unbounded’, ‘ungrounded’, 
absolutism, whereby the fundamental normative-epistemic notion of 
justification is wholly divorced from regulative, human, capacities). 
Within these bounds one may offer an account of rationality or 
epistemic justification that is closer to Meliorism or Panglossianism. 
Remarked upon are my respondents’ considerations on Alston, on 
suggestions for a separation between a more-subjective epistemic 
justification and a more-objective rationality, and objections to my 
position based on the assumption that we must embrace a very 
objective and truth-conducive concept of epistemic justification. 
 
Heartfelt thanks are due, and here given, to all my commentators, Shira Elqayam, 
Nikolaj Nottelmann, Rik Peels and Hamid Vahid—I am flattered to have respondents 
of such quality. I face a quandary: to respond individually or collectively. I will try a 
little of each but more of the latter, with me sometimes going off on a meander of my 
own. Unavoidably, if I am to make even a halfway adequate response within a 
reasonable timescale I will miss many important and worthwhile points—I am sorry 
about this: please re-make these points in rejoinder and we can begin dialectic. Please 
bear in mind this is, as it were, a ‘workshop’ style of discussion. I am not able to be 
anything like as careful in getting positions right as I would be in a refereed journal 
exchange.  
 
Collectively, there is an issue about how much (to what extent) those of my 
interlocutors who are coming from classic normative epistemology, appreciate the 
intellectual hardness, seriousness, difficulty, of reconnoitring this issue, involving as it 
does, an appreciation of issues arising from other disciplines.2 Allow me to state some 
claims I believe to be true.  
 
                                                
1 Major thanks are due to Jim Collier for facilitating this discussion. My thanks to all my respondents 
for their responses to my paper. 
2 My respondents engaged slightly less than I might have wished with issues specific to the cultural-
psychological, anthropological and cognitive-psychological literatures (matters relatively novel to the 
epistemic literature that are to be found in my paper)—as opposed, that is, to more classic and well-
worn issues in normative epistemology; but these latter issues certainly interest me and certainly 
engage with the commitments of my paper. 
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❧ Culture penetrates deeply into our cognition. It does not simply stop 
at the surface. The Luria/Vygotsky example I employed (of culture-
ladenness in capacity for reasoning employing modus ponens) is just 
one example—there are plenty of others, for which this one case may 
hold place. The reader may consult the cultural psychology/ 
psychological anthropology literatures at his or her leisure. These 
literatures are not examples of jejune armchair relativism: they are the 
product of costly, painstaking empirical data collection and careful 
attempts at interpretation by sensitive researchers working within 
intellectually serious disciplines. Do not think you can dismiss this one 
example as some kind of artefact or curio and move on. Do not think 
that the cultural psychologists/anthropologists just need your 
quickness of thought and conceptual dexterity (and distaste for 
relativism) and they would have dealt with these issues from the 
armchair easily enough. They are plenty bright enough, they are 
reporting what they find, the problems are vexed. 
❧ These cases generally permit of no easy dismissal and no simple 
interpretation. For instance, the Cohen-Chomsky competence-
performance distinction, though suggestive, and though an approach 
that I am very tempted by myself (as far as it goes) is an approach that 
will not be sufficient (not nearly sufficient) to explain these data in 
their entirety. But it may go some distance. Working out what is more 
‘surface’ (performance) and what is ‘deeper’ (competence) is difficult, 
trappy, the devil is in the detail. 
❧ Empirically, there are of course cross-cultural universals in human 
cognition.3 And (nothing to do with empirical issues in cognition) 
there are transcendent absolute truths. No-one should be a relativist 
about truth. No-one either should fall foul of Theaetetan peritrope 
arguments (whether or not pertaining to truth). In this hugely important 
sense I am not a relativist. No-one should be a relativist in this, the 
most important sense of ‘relativism’. 
❧ Rationality/justification (I will get to the putative distinction) isn’t 
like truth, it isn’t like lower-level cognition, it mostly isn’t like 
knowledge (though due to my great respect for the Bartlettian socio-
cognitive tradition in knowledge research I hedge on that too, to a 
degree). Rationality/justification is far more perspectivally bounded, 
and grounded, than these. How bounded (which bounds) then becomes 
the issue. 
❧ For the deontological tradition, a moral realism about the ethics of 
belief (perhaps ‘normativism’? I have never been entirely clear on the 
precise meaning of the phrase) is assimilated to a specifically deontic 
                                                
3 Pace Elqayam, I am not building any account of rationality upon such. I do not propose “a hard core 
of normative absolutes” (Elqayam 2015, 48). There may be some rationality/justificatory absolutes 
(‘fixed bridgeheads’—like modus ponens) or there may be just neo-Lucretian variable bridgeheads (the 
view that any putative rational absolutes may be absent, yet still the agent may be rational: any, but not 
all). I hedge on these issues: they will require the philosopher to work closely with the data. 
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form of normative appraisal. This, combined with ‘ought’ implies 
‘can’ (OIC), leads to perspectival bounds for one kind of normative-
epistemic appraisal—namely, (deontic) justification (to be more-or-
less identified with rationality by one strand of epistemological 
tradition, but not by others).  
❧ Even more ‘objectivist’ epistemic and psychological (‘Meliorist’) 
traditions investigating rationality/justification are not in any sense 
unbounded. They just have a more idealized, more ‘objective’ criterion 
for epistemic success.  
 
We then face a range of possible positions regarding the acceptable bounds for what 
could count as constituting our epistemic success-state. We need to start by 
identifying limit positions, positions that are so bounded (subjective) that they are 
worthless, and positions that are so unbounded (idealized, objective) that they are 
worthless. Let us start with the former. 
 
What is a ‘Get out of Jail Free Card’? Conceptual Limit-Panglossianism 
 
Lockie talks of a “get out of jail free” card—Nottelmann’s carte blanch; Stich-
Elqayam’s ‘anything goes’. Nottelmann, rather nicely, puts it that any such position 
entails no ‘appearance-reality distinction’: if it seems to you you’re justified, you are. 
This represents a level of anti-realism whereby the epistemology (n.b. of 
epistemology, of justification/rationality, the ‘appearance’ of justification) has 
become identified with the reality thereof: the metaphysics (n.b. of epistemology, of 
justification/rationality). Vahid identifies an equivalent position for one who embraces 
a very strong take on Alston’s ‘subjectively justified’ (Alston’s own take on 
‘subjective justification’ equivocates between this and a more moderate conception, 
as we shall see in the next paragraphs).4 I take it, with my interlocutors, that there is, 
conceptually, such a ‘limit’ position. To effect connections with the psychological 
literature we might call this Conceptual Limit-Panglossianism. I take it that this is 
indeed a limit position no-one should want to occupy. 
 
Notice however, how close we can sail to this limit yet still remain in an intellectually 
substantive position (whether one you wish to occupy or not, still, not a vapid non-
position). My own formative influence, my former teacher Richard Foley, comes to 
mind here, with what has come to be called ‘Foley Rationality’. Foley devoted two 
book-length treatments to what would be involved in being ‘egocentrically rational’ 
(being justified by one’s own deepest intellectual standards—e.g. Foley 1993). This is 
a strong (subjectivist) perspectivism, a species of relativism if you like.5 But Foley by 
no means articulates a series of facile pseudo-constraints whereby ‘anything goes’. 
His is a highly rigorous neo-Cartesian species of deep inner intellectual auditing—
Descartes without his circle, admittedly, Descartes without a benevolent God to 
                                                
4 Some of Alston’s arguments are couched in terms of evidence and some of my respondents touch 
upon issues of evidentialism. I did not couch my arguments in terms of evidence and (separately) have 
no commitments one way or the other regarding the debates about ‘evidentialism’. 
5 Burnyeat (1976a, 1976b) identified two targets of the Platonic (and later Greek) peritrope arguments 
against relativism: subjectivism and cultural relativism. These are the well-springs of those forms of 
relativism that persist into our own times. Epistemic perspectivism is a species of relativism, but this 
may be a subjectivist (individualist, bounded) position or a cultural (collectivist, grounded) position. 
Foley exemplifies the former. Peritrope arguments apply to incautiously totalising versions of either. 
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guarantee a connection to the objective truth; but then (as we surely know by now) 
no-one gets that for free in epistemology.6 
 
Consider Alston (especially his 1985) under whom several notions of subjective 
justification are entertained. Vahid goes into textual detail to correct and analytically 
sharpen my simplified Alston. (A point: I was using a simplified Alston for my own 
philosophical purposes, not doing precise textual exegesis on his work7). Note: 
Alston’s  ‘Subjective Justification’ is at the hard end of subjectivity; but it is not, in 
and of itself, at the conceptual limit thereof—to the point where it becomes vacuous 
pseudo-justification. Alston introduces the concept after the notion of ‘objective 
justification’, drawing the contrast  [initially, as applied to behaviour] thus: 
 
[‘Subjective Justification’] 
 
But suppose I did what I sincerely believed would bring about A? In 
that case surely no one could blame me for dereliction of duty. That 
suggests a more subjective conception of my obligation as doing what 
I believed was likely to bring about A. But perhaps I should not be let 
off as easily as that ... (Alston 1985 in Alston 1989, 86-7, emphasis 
added). 
 
Perhaps I should not; but doing what I sincerely believe to be right is not to be let off 
as easily as all that, is it? It is very far from a ‘get out of jail free card’; it is very far 
from an ‘anything goes’ or carte blanche attitude. It is very far from an empty 
abandonment of any strictures on justification at all, is it not? It is a very subjective 
notion of justification, granted; and without Alston’s (and my own) qualifications—
leading (for Alston) in a direction towards his other (“still a subjective conception”) 
concept, namely of cognitive justification—perhaps it may not go far enough (at least 
in many epistemic contexts) but it is an important notion of justification for all that; 
and it sets a normative epistemic standard of which many people, in many contexts of 
inquiry, indeed fall short.  
 
                                                
6 I endorse, very radically, the ‘Foley divorce’ between the theory of knowledge and the theory of 
justified belief (Foley 2004, Lockie 2014a)—my distaste for a reified, hypostatised account of the latter 
is of a piece with this. Separately, and as a quite distinct issue: Foley does not to my eyes mark 
Elqayam’s distinction between pragmatic and normative rationality, whereby “Pragmatic or 
instrumental rationality is about achieving one’s goals; normative rationality is about conforming to a 
normative standard” (Elqayam 2015, 48). I myself do not make a lot of sense of this distinction. 
Instrumental rationality may be normative (it is for Foley); and deontology, though it may sometimes 
be defined in terms of rules-following, should not be (it should rather be seen in terms of an adherence 
to a sui generis axiology of obligation, with cognate notions of OIC, culpability, responsibility, blame, 
etc.). 
7 Vahid makes a point, as regards the dialectic of Alston’s argument, that is well taken as far as it goes: 
Alston indeed identifies his various subjective-objective distinctions prior to making the epistemic 
poverty argument against deontologism. Were I concerned with Alstonian exegesis, that would be an 
important point (as it is, it is a worthwhile reminder). In terms of the (temporal, not logical) structure of 
the dialectic, Vahid’s point is sound, and defends Alston’s registration of the subjective-objective 
distinction prior to the emergence in the same work of the epistemic poverty objection. For more on the 
history of this dialectic (in ethics as well as epistemology) see my 2014a. Although I introduce my 
arguments with Alston’s ‘tribesman’ example, Alston was most certainly not the first to consider the 
role of an objective-subjective distinction in addressing epistemic (or ethical) poverty problems for 
deontology, and in the context of these other figures (see my 2014a) this distinction is certainly put 
forward to defend the latter position. 
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In a nice analogy, Elqayam (2015, 48) compares the commitments of a strong 
Panglossianism about rationality (the preconditions of such) to having a functioning 
working memory, or pair of eyes—something most of us have. On an Alston/Foley 
conception of (even very strong) Panglossianism this should be changed to something 
like the ability and preparedness to use your working memory (however ‘working’ it 
is) carefully, with effortful attention and conscientiousness8 in a fairly draining task. 
Or it would be like using your eyesight with vigilance and concentration throughout a 
long watch. The great majority of the human race can do these things, not by any 
means do they.9 
 
Alston discerns, and partly (gesturally) analyses many possible notions of justification 
on a continuum between the most subjective through to the most objective. For 
example, he notes one could make his ‘subjective justification’ even more subjective 
(only believing oneself to have discharged what one only believed to be one’s 
obligation); noting, however, of these possible distinctions “but sufficient unto the 
day is the distinction thereof” (Alston 1985 in Alston 1989, 86 F.N. 10). Agreed (and, 
re: ‘sufficient unto the day’ see my remarks below, of Peel’s distinction between 
‘justification’ and ‘rationality’).  
 
Alston outlines a very important subjective notion of justification, baptising this as 
‘subjective justification’ per se; but notes the possibility of more subjective notions of 
justification (only believing oneself to have discharged obligations, or even—
additionally—obligations one only believes oneself to possess). Provided his 
                                                
8 Actually (importantly) this approaches something rather closer to an exemplar of e.g. Foley 
Rationality (or some other species of subjectivist deontically internalist justification) than does it an 
analogy thereto.  
9 Note Elqayam’s important point: “If an agent has, e.g., low working memory capacity, or lacks the 
necessary cognitive tools, satisficing is not just a sensible option: it might optimise epistemic value for 
a given cognitive cost” (Elqayam 2015, 49). But (as I’m sure Elqayam realises) this is not just true of 
low functioning agents but of all fully-functioning agents (we are all epistemically impoverished). 
Rather than high-functioning agents being an exception to the need for heuristic, resource-attenuated 
compromise, it is low functioning agents (mind: very low functioning—e.g. mentally handicapped—
agents) who may be exceptions to this. As people ascend in individual difference abilities (IQ, 
executive functioning) they increase their meta-cognitive capabilities: their capacities for planning how 
to ‘satisfice’, how to allocate scarce cognitive resources (how to schedule, task share, task switch, 
allocate attention, gate off working memory, select appropriate mental sets, consider future 
consequences etc. etc.). In the other direction though, as these abilities get poorer and poorer, a 
threshold may be approached. When damaged individuals get below a certain threshold they may 
indeed be outside of what in my paper I called “the community of rational agents”—or they may be 
only fragmentarily and episodically inside that community. It’s not that high (enough) functioning 
agents (epistemically non-impoverished agents) run optimising algorithms, whereas low-functioning 
agents (epistemically impoverished agents) run e.g. ‘satisficing’ heuristics. It’s that the highest 
functioning agents have really good metapsychological resources, giving them the capacity needed to 
run really sophisticated (really elegant, perhaps—as for Peels—really ‘rational’) metapsychological 
e.g. ‘satisficing’ heuristics. Below a certain threshold (a very low threshold—e.g. mental handicap) 
agents may have exceptionally damaged executive functioning (say: working memory, or attention, or 
capacity for ‘prospection’) whereby clever, metapsychological resource allocation even ‘bounded’ 
relative to their limits is not possible. This is what I meant in my paper when I stated “There will be 
limits to how objectively irrational a subject can be before he or she is too damaged to be considered a 
part of the community of rational agents at all; but these limits can’t, surely, be so restrictive as to 
require the community of rational agents to include all and only those with a modern university 
education, or written language, or grasp of statistics, or basic arithmetic, or any level of formal, 
abstract, education at all. Most humans who have ever lived have been rational animals” (Lockie 2015, 
9). 
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‘sincerely’ proviso remains in force, even the two-fold combination of these latter 
subjective restrictions to his already subjective conception of justification does not 
seem vapid to me (nor, I conjecture, to Alston) though it is somewhat closer to what I 
have called Conceptual Limit Panglossianism—closer to vapidity, closer to a Get out 
of Jail Free card. 
 
He later retrenches from this talk of ‘subjective justification’ as involving sincerely 
believing when he considers the equivalent of ‘subjective justification’ as applied to 
the grounds for a belief, thus: “If I believe them [my grounds for belief] to be 
adequate just because I have an egotistical penchant to overestimate my powers that 
would hardly make it rational for me to believe that p” (Alston 1985 in Alston 1989: 
102). This surely is beyond our conceptual limit. Sincerely believing is a substantial 
justificatory constraint precisely because “an egotistical penchant to overestimate my 
powers” can so patently be seen as violating it. Conceptual Limit Panglossianism is 
precisely an example of a Carte Blanche / Get Out of Jail Free card because it would 
endorse any belief, however formed, as rational; whereas Foley Rationality / sincerely 
believing, although very perspectivally limited, still excludes much. 
 
Alston also considers a variety of (descriptively) subjective justification which he 
contrasts with his ‘Subjective Justification’ where this latter is employed as a proper 
name (as term of art). He notes very explicitly of his ‘Cognitive Justification’ that it 
too, is still a subjective notion of justification, albeit a less subjective notion of 
justification than his term-of-art ‘subjective justification’ per se, amounting to the 
following. 
 
[‘Cognitive Justification’] 
 
I can’t fulfill my obligation by doing just anything I happen to believe 
will bring about A.  I am not off the hook unless I did what the facts 
available to me indicate will have a good chance of leading to A. This 
is still a subjective conception in that what it takes to fulfill my 
obligation is specified from  my point of view; but it takes my point of 
view to range over not all my beliefs, but only my justified beliefs. 
This we might call a cognitive conception of my obligation (Alston 
1985 in Alston 1989, 87). 
 
Alston’s italicised clause suggests two things at least prima facie at odds with each 
other: the facts (objective, potentially entirely inaccessible) and available to me 
(subjective, necessarily accessible). This ambiguity / equivocation resurfaces in the 
clause “indicate will have a good chance of leading to A”. Does this mean indicate to 
me? (A natural, subjective, reading) or indicate in some objective, informational, 
sense: indicate inasmuch as the information contained within these facts is, 
objectively, an indicator (like, say, a chemical indicator)—that these facts have a good 
chance of leading to A? (An objective reading). Must the ‘justified beliefs’ which my 
point of view ranges over be subjectively or objectively justified in turn? 
 
In, I’d suggest, rather dubiously motivated material, Alston (1985, in Alston 1089, 89) 
indicates that he rejects even a moderate ‘subjective justification’ conception of 
subjective justification in favour of a ‘cognitive justification’ conception of subjective 
justification (‘scare quotes’ indicating Alston’s term of art, italics indicating the thing 
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in nature—justification that is in some sense subjective). That is, he rejects the idea of 
someone being epistemically justified merely in virtue of them believing they have, 
e.g. evidence for their belief, and that this evidence is good. This rules out a strong, 
OIC-perspectivally-constrained deontologism (a neo-Cartesian, Clifford, Foley-
Rational approach) by fiat. Alston then, offers us as good an example as any, of how 
very subjective positions (and for ‘subjective’ read ‘perspectival’ most generally—to 
include culturally perspectival limits) may be at the conceptual limit of 
Panglossianism, or fall short of this. Here is a rough linear ordering of Alstonian 
positions (but a reminder: I am using a simplified Alston for my own philosophical 
purposes, not doing precise textual exegesis on his work). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A rough linear ordering of some (not all) Alstonian positions (not for the 
purposes of Alstonian exegesis, but for my own further purposes, and not very 
carefully checked against Alston’s text). 
 
Conceptual Limit Panglossianism amounts to Lockie’s “get out of jail free” card, 
Nottelmann’s carte blanch; Stich-Elqayam’s ‘anything goes’. Here there is no 
‘appearance-reality distinction’: if it seems to you that you’re justified (however little 
this “seems to you” amounts to) then you are. If I have Alston’s “egotistical penchant 
to overestimate my powers” I may be here. No one is defending a species of epistemic 
‘justification’ like this. And hence, no-one should be saddled with this as a (straw) 
commitment of their position. This is a conceptual limit to perspectivism, whether 
subjectivist or cultural. Intellectually serious projects in subjectivist, perspectival, 
epistemology begin further to the right than this.  
 
Typically there may be, for instance, some kind of a Chisholmian or Foley-like 
ascent, or reflective-equilibration around, or dialectic-between, or bootstrapping-
towards, non-limit positions to the right of this. In the cultural-psychological 
literature, a Vygotskian Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) will precisely be what 
is beyond our present limits, but not so far beyond these that in seeking after an aim of 
idealized, objective success (truth, e.g., of our beliefs) we may not travel into this 
Most 
subjectivist 
Direction 
towards greater 
objectivism e.g. “egotistical 
penchant to 
overestimate 
my powers” 
Conceptual Limit 
Panglossianism 
‘Subjective Justification’ 
(as Alstonian term of art) 
Only i) believing 
oneself to have 
discharged what 
ii) one only 
believes to be 
one’s obligation 
Sincerely 
believing 
oneself to have 
discharged 
one’s 
obligations 
‘Cognitive Justification’ (as 
Alstonian term of art) 
Agent doing what the facts available 
to him indicate will have a good 
chance of leading to discharge of 
obligation: agent is justified in 
believing he has discharged his 
(perspectival) obligations 
Agent subjectively 
justified in believing he 
has discharged his 
(perspectival) obligations 
Agent objectively 
justified in believing he 
has discharged his 
(perspectival) obligations 
All are species of subjective justification 
(as descriptive term, not term of art) 
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ZPD over time. An ‘objective’ (my term) take on Alstonian ‘Cognitive Justification’ 
may be within my ZPD—or it may not. A 1930’s Uzbek may be able, with effort and 
time and enough Vygotskian scaffolding, to achieve an understanding of very 
concrete, ‘culture-fair’ versions of modus ponens, or he may not (from the cultural 
psychological literature more generally: either he will not, or his responses will be 
chronically ambiguous and open to interpretation, and anyway, pace Peels, there are 
real conceptual problems with the notion of legitimate restrictions of formal—
decontextualized, decoupled, true-in-virtue-of-form-alone—species of logical 
reasoning to very concrete, ‘culture-fair’ versions of problems being set: cf. remarks 
in my paper about rational norms concerning the appropriate heuristics and algorithms 
employed by participants for task construal (e.g. Stanovich, West, and Toplak 2011) 
and with the fact that decontextualizing task construal is a big, constitutive, part of 
what such ‘rational abilities’ are all about).  
 
If, with effort and time, an understanding of modus ponens is securely enough within 
our Uzbek’s ZPD we may say his problems are mere performance, rather than 
competence errors; but mostly, the extensive cultural psychology/anthropology 
literatures indicate nothing so irenic. Decontextualized cognition is a rather radical 
cultural-cognitive boundary,10 not by any means one located merely on the cognitive 
periphery; though interpretations of what is ‘front end’ and what is deeper are 
chronically vague, ambiguous, and difficult to be sure about. [Semi-]intractable 
problems with achieving correct task construal may themselves constitute quite a lot 
of what the problem of achieving ‘decoupled’, counterfactual, abstract, 
decontextualized, thought amounts to in itself: what appears to be a ‘surface’ issue 
may in fact be rather substantially (to some extent constitutively) intertwined with 
what it is that the deeper problem actually amounts to.   
 
There may be a more emic, perspectivist, approach to rationality or a more etic 
approach. Both have their place, and (especially) a dialectic between these has its 
place—very much so (I wish to emphasise this point). But there will not only be 
conceptual (e.g. Theaetetan) limits on how emic one can get. There are also limits on 
how etic. There are ‘moral’ (OIC) limits to how far one may push an ‘imposed etic’ 
account of rationality/justification; but also more general limits on this latter, limits 
deriving from what one might call the ‘absurdity’ of such a project—limits I indicated 
in my paper, limits I shall indicate again; limits Elqayam (notably, out of my 
respondents) needed no reminding of.  
 
Conceptual Limit Absolutism 
 
There are serious problems with a notion of ‘objective rationality’. How objective? 
Push things too far and we get simply true. An ‘objectively rational’ belief is just a 
true belief. No-one wants to go that far—but how far do we go?   
                                                
10 One might analogise it (only as analogy) to the mooted transition in Kuhnian philosophy of science 
between pre-paradigmatic and paradigmatic science. After one is post-paradigmatic and within the 
Kuhnian cycle, an issue emerges as to whether one embraces Meliorism (a Whig history, 
verisimilitude)—a question Kuhn, I take it, equivocated on (though I should not: clearly science, across 
both its ‘normal science’ and revolutionary shifts makes progress towards the truth). However, prior to 
the emergence of paradigmatic science, we are not even at the races. The transition from pre- to post-
paradigmatic science represents a revolution in human thought that is more fundamental (incomparably 
more fundamental) than any that comes after. 
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All parties to these debates will be arguing either forwards from the 
capabilities/freedoms/limits cognitive agents are acknowledged to possess—to see 
whether said agent had reasoned as well as he is able within those limits (say, within 
his ZPD). Or, parties to these debates will be arguing backwards from a prior, 
idealized and supposedly independent conception of ‘good reasoning’ conceived in 
the abstract (an objective, Meliorist, rationality, formulated supposedly independently 
of that agent’s cognitive limits)—then to see if said agent reasons as he [objectively] 
ought (as would be ‘right’, notwithstanding he may be unable to achieve this 
standard).  
 
Note that this latter ‘ought’ now threatens to have no motivation to stop itself short of 
an unbounded ought: a ‘superlative’ ought, an ‘ought’ which does not imply ‘can’ (cf. 
Owens 2000, for one of several who knowingly, but to my mind recklessly, 
heedlessly, flouts this constraint). It has no reason to stop itself even at, say, a strong 
Meliorisim (perhaps, a very strong Wide Reflective Equilibrium position—whereby 
only a few thousand persons in the history of the human race have ever been, in this 
proprietary sense, ‘rational’; with perhaps all of these born within the last few 
hundred years). Worryingly, it has no obvious reason to stop itself within human 
biological, or even extended, socioculturally augmented, bounds.  
 
If this blue-collar worker, or (worse) tribesman, or caveman, may be held to be 
irrational for failing to reason (however diligently) to a statistical error-estimate quite 
beyond his bounds (or grounds), why then insist that John von Neumann was rational 
because he reasoned heuristically with the greatest diligence, to a statistical error-
estimate heuristic inference that no other human who ever lived could have 
computed? Why not demur that rather he was irrational for failing to compute the 
determinate (non-estimated, non-statistical) algorithm itself, even though it would 
require computations at a rate of a trillion petaflops in a humanly unattainable 
working memory (not the magic number 7, plus or minus 2, but the magic number 
gazillion), using a set of theorems yet to be discovered, which latter would require the 
human species a billion years to derive? 11 
 
The limit positions here are just completely uninteresting. All (informed) participants 
in these debates embrace a bounded rationality. As I stated in my paper (following the 
very apposite quotation from Oaksford and Chater 1992): 
 
The issue is not then, one of bounded versus unbounded rationality, 
but of how bounded, and which bounds. I believe there can be no 
principled grounds for including species-wide biological constraints 
(working memory, processing speed, etc.) yet not cultural constraints 
(which will also be mediated and expressed biologically) (Lockie 
2015, 8).  
 
Absent an argument for either a general hard determinism/incompatibilism or a 
specifically ‘cognitive’ version thereof, the severely perspectivally limited agent 
nevertheless has freedom to reason well or ill—and thus does not have a get out of jail 
                                                
11 The rhetorical question makes perhaps a slightly implausible assumption: von Neumann would 
probably have computed the determinate function—cf. the hoary von Neumann ‘train-fly’ (sometimes: 
‘bicycle-swallow’) heuristic/algorithm anecdote: http://www.math.utah.edu/~cherk/mathjokes.html  
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free card—merely a card stating “get out of being castigated for not reasoning in a 
way that lies clearly beyond your zone of proximal development: get out of being 
castigated for being irresponsible when avowedly you reasoned to a position of being 
Foley Rational”. I want my cogniser to get out of Jail on that appeal. I’d want a pass 
on that myself—and so would you.  
 
Note, moreover, that even a very idealised Meliorism (one which opposed ZPD limits 
on rationality) is still (to some extent) a ‘bounded’ position (one which dismisses a 
normative standard involving the gazillion petaflops/WM issue canvassed above). The 
interesting limits (the limits within which interesting and informed debate can take 
place) are between a position just, fractionally, shy of Conceptual Limit-
Panglossianism at the one extreme, and a position just shy of a Humanly Unbounded 
‘Rationality’ at the other extreme: between these limits, debate can occur. We can see 
then, the strengths and weaknesses of different stances on rationality/justification we 
can take—and we can situate them on the illustration I shall offer below.  
 
A Foley Rationality or Vygotskian/anthropological/emic ZPD is one (family of) 
position(s) just short of the conceptual limit that we can take, and very interesting 
these positions are too in my judgement (and I speak as a metaphysical absolutist and 
a ‘normativist’—a moral realist). And a very harsh, irrationalist, idealized, objectivist, 
Wide Reflective Equilibrium stance might be an example of the other. We could 
situate a Cohen-style narrow reflective equilibrium (that of an arch, educated, 
headmasterly ‘Man on the Clapham Omnibus’) closer to ZPD Panglossianism, but 
with its ungrounded, highly decontextualized and WEIRD12 aspects still (in my 
conception of things) making it a somewhat Meliorist stance. We can place the 
earlier, more gleefully irrationalist heuristics-and-biases literature nearer to 
conceptual limit Meliorism (points Cohen’s 1981 and Dennett’s 1981 transcendental 
arguments sought to exploit); and we can place the later, less gleeful, less irrationalist 
literature somewhat (a little) closer to the ZPD than this. 
 
With the idea of a zone of proximal development in mind (and the very important 
point that we are active cognisers, that we can, within limits, sometimes with cultural 
scaffolding, sometimes through our own exploratory cognitive virtues, travel into and 
around that zone) here is a sketch of a range of possible options for the limits on 
accessibility available to a theorist of rationality; with these arranged not on a line but 
as concentric circles—zones—from Conceptual Limit Panglossianism to Conceptual 
Limit Absolutism. Note that despite the labels and the perimeters being marked out by 
concentric rings, these positions are on a continuum. The limit positions here (at least: 
the limits of the limit positions) are, I take it, simply to be avoided. And ‘travel’ into a 
ZPD that involves a transition to decontextualized thought may be (for contextualized 
cognisers) something empirically impossible except, as Luria/Vygotsky indicated, 
across generations. 
  
                                                
12 Western Educated Industrialised Rich Democratic: Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010). 
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Figure 2. Positions on restrictions regarding the attainability of 
justification/rationality. (Despite the concentric rings, these positions are on a 
continuum). 
 
CONCEPTUAL LIMIT-
ABSOLUTISM (God’s 
‘Rationality’) an infallible, 
instantaneous capacity to 
know all and only truths 
with no computational, 
temporal or otherwise 
resource-based limits on 
cognitive achievement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MR: Meliorist Rationality 
CLA (God’s  
‘Rationality’) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Humanly Unbounded ‘Rationality’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZPD Justification 
CLP 
CONCEPTUAL LIMIT-PANGLOSSIANISM 
Lockie’s “get out of jail free” card; Nottelmann’s 
carte blanch; Stich-Elqayam’s ‘anything goes’—
no ‘appearance-reality distinction’: if it seems to 
you you’re justified, you are; Vahid’s very strong 
take on Alston’s ‘subjectively justified’ (Alston’s 
own take on ‘subjective justification’ equivocates 
between this and a more ZPD conception) 
ZONE OF PROXIMAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
(Vygotsky); perspectivist 
justification; Lockie’s 
deliberately elided 
justification/rationality; Peel’s 
justification [deliberately 
distinguished from 
rationality]; Foley-
Rationality; Panglossian 
rationalism; bounded (/& 
grounded?) rationality; 
[perhaps] a more subjective 
take on Vahid-Alston’s 
‘cognitively justified’ 
HUMANLY UNBOUNDED ‘RATIONALITY’: 
limited in some sense perhaps; but unbounded by 
human biological or even quite extended-cultural 
limits, the kind of ‘rationality’ our cognitive 
prostheses (supercomputers etc.,) might one day 
be capable of, or Martians etc., might be capable 
of—as cognitively removed from our limits as we 
are to lesser apes, or dolphins, or dogs. 
MELIORIST RATIONALITY 
Highly idealised, decontextualized, 
ungrounded, relatively unbounded 
(but still indexed relative to human 
rational achievements, albeit 
idealised, high-end achievements, 
hence bounded up to a point). 
[perhaps] Vahid-Alston’s 
‘objectively justified’. Note: there 
is a lot of variation within this 
sector in how Meliorist (how 
irrationalist) these positions are. 
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Distinction Between Justification and Rationality 
 
As Peels notes, I do indeed, repeatedly run together ‘justified’ with ‘rational’. Some 
of the time I feel a little ashamed of this, mostly I do not—but I do and did so 
knowingly, and with malice aforethought. ‘Justification’ can be used as a placeholder 
for any axiological success state, any kind of normative epistemic achievement (so-
considered, knowledge is a type of very objective epistemic justification; but I shall 
shelve this usage after mentioning it once, as being dangerously distracting—and, 
pace Peels (2015: 48) I certainly do not believe that justification is necessary for 
knowledge in any other sense: cf. my earlier, footnoted, endorsement of the Foley 
(2004) divorce, expanded upon in Lockie (2014a)). More commonly, as Peels advises, 
‘justification’ can be used as a highly deontic term. As many have noted, in 
[allegedly] ‘ordinary’ language it has deontic connotations from the off.  
 
My linguistic intuitions tell me that ‘justified’ and its cognates are 
properly used only in a deontological sense. To be justified in doing or 
believing . . . something just is to not have violated any relevant rules, 
norms, or principles in so doing, believing. . . . If, as I believe, most 
epistemologists use ‘justified’ for some quite different notion, they are 
speaking infelicitously. However, this way of talking is so firmly 
entrenched that I shall go along with it, albeit with an uneasy linguistic 
conscience (Alston 1988 in Alston 1989, 143).  
 
I agree wholeheartedly with Alston here. In order to engage in debate and not to beg 
the question against opponents or representatives of whole epistemic traditions, I 
sometime use ‘justified’ as a neutral marker term for candidate approaches to 
epistemic normativity in the abstract, despite having a distaste for it used thus, and 
feeling, with Alston, that its Ur meaning is deontological. In this I am highly tempted 
to agree with Peels:  
 
One could make the strong assertion that the deontological conception 
of epistemic justification is the right conception of epistemic 
justification (Peels 2015, 43). 13 
 
I do not want, however, to win any terminological victories. As Alston notes, there is 
more than one notion of epistemic normativity afoot in epistemology. I will die in a 
ditch to insist the deontological notion is a crucially important notion of epistemic 
                                                
13 I am, however, bemused by what immediately follows this passage: “..because epistemic justification 
is a subjective notion” [Loc. Cit.]. Surely this is the wrong way round? The sui generis deontological 
character of epistemic justification (which I, after Alston, Clifford, Descartes etc. deeply endorse) 
would entail subjective restrictions; these subjective restrictions would be necessary not sufficient for 
the deontological character of justification—and derivative therefrom. Separately, note that I am not 
interested in the ‘real’ meaning of ‘epistemic internalism’, nor yet to distinguish and discuss the merits 
of other prevalent meanings of it (Nottelmann’s 2016, 22 “standard internalist positions”). Internalism 
is a term of art (and a Protean one at that): one which has been around for only about 35 years, though 
the philosophical positions which motivated its emergence date back centuries. Of course there are 
more purely accessibilist, and mentalist (and other) conceptions of this elastic term. I think I have made 
very clear in my paper the sole conception of this term that interests me: deontic internalism whereby 
the deontic normative core comes first and the accessibilist restrictions (which are in no sense 
definitive of the position) come a long way after. Other people don’t use the term ‘internalism’ like 
this; but since there is no danger of my usage being confused with theirs, that is their business and of 
no interest to me. 
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justification, and have made clear that with Alston (and Plantinga, and Clifford, and 
Peels) I would rather regard it as the Echt notion thereof. If readers (who may wish to 
employ their own preferred notion of ‘justification’) understand that I am employing 
it thus, that is enough. 
 
Used in this deontic sense, and assuming ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, we have a direct 
entailment to a subjective, ‘access-restrictive’ constraint on what the agent may be 
held responsible for. Here, the sense of ‘access’ at issue is very important. Pace 
Nottelmann,  
 
1. The access restrictions come after the deontic core—so it’s not (not 
in any useful, non-misleading sense) an ‘access internalism’14. At the 
conceptual heart of ‘justification’ conceived thus, is sui generis 
deontic force: pure normative obligation, an ‘ethics of belief’ [deontic 
ethics, that is]. (I will ignore issues of whether epistemic obligation is 
a sub-species of ethics more generally—such debates are familiar 
elsewhere). So this is deontic internalism notwithstanding that it will 
entail, as a consequence, access restrictions.  
 
2. ‘Access’ here is itself a placeholder—it doesn’t (mostly) mean 
‘access’ simpliciter. To give a glimpse of my larger epistemological 
project: the ‘can’ restrictions of the OIC entailment require both an 
afferent and an efferent component. That is, it requires an afferent, 
passive, access component (alone ‘access’ properly so-called—what 
McHugh (2013) calls reasons responsiveness). This may to some 
extent involve an introspective, phenomenal, conscious, etc., access, 
but even as access, it is probably not restricted to these things). And it 
requires an efferent, active, agential, actional, regulative, directive, 
component (what McHugh calls reasons reactivity): the ability to 
direct and regulate one’s cognition—say, to initiate and shape a 
process of reasoning leading to a solution to a given problem. ‘Access’ 
as umbrella term for the ‘can’ component of OIC requires both of 
these things, acting in concert; but the latter is considerably more 
important than the former.  
 
There can be de facto (OIC ‘can’) psychological limits on either of these. Some of the 
problems of contextualized cognisers may be problems of understanding the nature of 
the problem set—e.g. ‘front end’ problems, of demand characteristics, [Chomskian] 
‘performance’ characteristics, ‘alternative task construal’ etc. But even these 
(perhaps) more afferent things are not by any means merely and purely passive, being 
incipiently actional to some considerable extent. And many (among them the most 
important) limits on cognisers strongly pertain to their regulative abilities—to direct 
their thoughts. In any event there are what Fuster (2013) calls ‘perception-action 
                                                
14 Vahid criticises me here on grounds that this view is “out of date”—citing the transition from early 
BonJour (1985: 8, 41-45) who accepted this deontic view of internalism but by 2003 (e.g. pp. 175-7) 
had changed his mind. I demur. A good argument doesn’t go out of date, and BonJour’s abandonment 
of his earlier perspectivalist defence against epistemic poverty was (in my judgement) entirely unwise 
and wholly regrettable. Anyone who embraces a deontic conception of justification and OIC must 
embrace access restrictions on their justificatory ground, and the latter are derivative from the former. 
See Lockie (2014a) for more here.  
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cycles’ (pervasively reapplied cycles) but with the actional more important than the 
perceptual (pace especially the early Kahneman-Tversky, for example, and their ‘neo-
perceptual’ model of heuristics and biases—of errors of reasoning as akin to 
perceptual illusions—cf. late Kahneman (2012) for explication). Man is not a passive 
animal—not cognitively anyway. We are here precisely concerned with what Reid 
would have called the ‘active powers of man’. 
 
Now the distinction between ‘justified’ and ‘rational’ that is offered me, is initially 
merely a terminological one (it may then become more than terminological, I 
concede; but I am not interested in any ordinary language connotations of these terms, 
having a severe aversion to that metaphilosophy). I am offered the chance to keep 
much of my reasoning as to there being quite serious perspectival restrictions on 
justification, provided I do not presume to assert these restrictions apply to rationality. 
Crudely: justification is subjective, rationality objective15 (one could qualify things 
here, and express nuances—I shall not). As indicated, I can see some point, in some 
contexts, to doing this—though I did not in my paper, and am somewhat ambivalent 
about doing so more generally.  
 
There is some point to an ‘objective’ notion of rationality (perhaps more than one 
such notion). But Elqayam’s Bayesian point and its cognates is and are well-
understood in the psychological (and economic) literature, and insufficiently 
appreciated by most epistemologists. Do we hold pre-Bayes thinkers were (in the 
respects at issue for us) irrational, or less rational than us? For a purpose we could 
say this, but in most contexts of concern to normative epistemologists (indeed of 
concern per se) it seems pretty silly to me.16 Who is the relativist here? Parochialism 
                                                
15 I can’t tell from the text, but is Vahid offering me (terminologically) the opposite distinction to Peels 
here? “After all there seems to be something essentially right about the claim that our concept of 
justification is sensitive to the truth conducivity of the grounds of beliefs. But Lockie makes no efforts 
in that direction. He does consult certain empirical investigations (such as Luria’s “white bear” case), 
but one can always argue that such cases pertain to rationality rather than justification” (Vahid 2016: 
16) 
16 Where we have similar, equally decontextualized subjects, each tackling similar tasks within similar 
environments (say: academic environments) and one has worked harder, and is better at the tasks in 
question, perhaps we might want to say this (actually, we might want to say the superior subject had 
higher intelligence or expertise or knowledge—even as regards the narrow range of tasks that tend to 
be used in the psychological literature: Bayesian tasks, Wason tasks, etc. etc.). But when we go to a 
comparison of decontextualized versus contextualized agents, or consider performance on more 
ecologically valid tasks, or different eras of intellectual history, or types of task found across very 
different disciplines or trades or activities or intellectual milieus, methinks not. We might note of 
agents that so-and-so is more or less rational than some comparison person or tacit population 
(especially when other things are held constant) but even within a decontextualized population I think 
the prospect entertained by Stanovich, West and Toplak (2011) of a standardised ‘rationality test’ (to 
be constructed on the model of an IQ test and involving a suite of standardised performative or pencil 
and paper tasks derived and normed up from what are currently experimental paradigms) will be 
forever out of reach—and this for deep reasons. Rationality is coextensive with the greatest and 
smallest cognitive-cultural achievements of mankind. It is greatly implausible to suppose rationality 
can be reduced to a procedure, or even a complex (but specifiable) logical sum out of a disjunctive set 
of procedures. Rationality is a matter of using all we have got (our cultural as well as our individual 
cognitive resources), using these resources as well as we are able, across all the epistemic contexts and 
challenges we encounter, over whatever the relevant timescale may be. There is no algorithm for 
rationality: it is too large and too open-ended a concept. As to the prospect of defending objectivity 
whilst discounting the possibility of ever achieving psychometric reliability or validity; well, it depends 
on your concept of ‘objectivity’ but a searching appraisal of problems with the latter would seem to me 
to point up problems with the former. 
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is a kind of relativism too, is it not? And a kind lacking the humility of more standard 
relativisms moreover. When we apply these issues to the difference, not between the 
members of a pre- and post-Bayes decontextualized educated elite, but instead to the 
gulf between a contextualized and decontextualized thinker, I can’t see it becomes 
any easier to motivate the distinction between objectively rational/irrational and 
subjectively justified/unjustified.  
 
Presumably, we are to believe a pre-Bayes thinker is eo ipso less rational (but not less 
justified) than a post Bayes thinker; and that a contextualized thinker is less rational 
(but not less justified) than a decontextualized thinker. Well, we can employ these 
terms thus, as terms of art if we want to, but mostly (not entirely) I wonder why we 
would want to. Without a dialectical purpose to drawing this distinction it is a mere 
terminological distinction—a bit of analytic casuistry. I don’t care what the ‘real’ 
meaning of technical philosophical terms like epistemic justification or rationality are 
(e.g. their connotations and nuances for e.g. Cohen’s omnibus passenger). What do I 
gain, philosophically, from such a distinction? A device to use in the context of other 
arguments, should these emerge, perhaps—but I could wait for any such arguments to 
emerge before drawing this or some other distinction. In regard to the Figure 2 above, 
where is this objectivist rationality?  
 
Presumably, one supposes, still just inside the humanly bounded limit, but closer to 
the hard edge of Meliorist Rationality—certainly not grounded, and not very bounded 
in a traditional sense. How categorical a position is this objectivist rationality? 
(Categorical as opposed to an ordinal tendency that is). Presumably not very 
categorical: a tendency towards the most objective (but still humanly bounded) end of 
this limit, with an arbitrary, say, analytic cut-off available to be drawn, but with any 
such distinction rather pointless until in the service of some other argument, one 
supposes. Will this conception of rationality have it that there was rationality (any 
epistemic rationality at all in the world) prior to, say, the invention of writing five 
thousand years ago? Prior to the agricultural revolution ten thousand years ago?  
 
If yes, what percentage of, say, a typical illiterate contextualized pre-industrialised 
(but agrarian) population will be rational [to our intended, ahistorical, culturally 
unsituated, objective, ‘cut off’ operationalisation thereof)? 1%? 0.001%? None? What 
percentage of a typical hunter-gatherer population? Which ‘culture fair’ versions of 
Linda the Feminist Bank Teller or Green Bayesian Cab/Blue Bayesian Cab shall we 
use as stick with which to beat them? And when we’re done, ask yourself: how long 
would you survive17 in their environment, solving their problems? Half a day? 
                                                
17 This point (‘survive’) made already in my paper, has nothing, nothing at all to do with evolutionary 
considerations. I have no interest in exploring the various notions of evolutionary rationality and am 
absolutely not appealing to such. It has to do with this far more quotidian point: we are all of us 
motivated by what the 17th and 18th century philosophers would have called ‘self-love’ are we not? We 
all (as individuals, not genes or species) want to survive and even to flourish if possible. Consider a 
highly contextualized agent (illiterate, pre-industrial, agrarian or even hunter-gatherer). He is no ‘noble 
savage’—his cognition is enormously sophisticated, and culturally embedded, as is the case for us all. 
You and he both want to survive (or even flourish) don’t you? You have that in common whatever else 
is different. You see his performance on a series of (probably) culture-unfair, (probably) ecologically 
invalid decontextualized laboratory tasks putatively translated [/transliterated] over to him from your 
culture, and worry that his problems are almost certainly not merely ‘front end’ performance errors, 
though surely they are that as well. But now place yourself in his problem space. See the complexity of 
his environment and the ingenuity he needs to survive, or even flourish. See how far short of his 
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If we, through simpatico, careful, anthropological, participant-observation have a 
deep appreciation of, and engagement with, the problems which the contextualized 
thinker addresses, his ‘cultural construction of the world’, we may come to the view 
that he is very rational indeed. And if we have a deep appreciation of the problems 
which a particular decontextualized thinker addresses, we may come to the view that 
he is really quite irrational—with little in the way of matched-group controls being 
even conceptually possible between these two thinkers. Look into the triviality and 
sterility of many (not all) of the laboratory experiments these literatures trade in, even 
where the population they are generalised to is strongly decontextualized. Look at the 
difficulties of finding an acceptable (agreed-as-correct) normative solution even for 
our own community of avowedly decontextualized thinkers (remarked upon by 
Elqayam). Look at the wholesale (deep, conceptual and empirical) impossibility of 
finding ‘culture fair’ equivalences between WEIRD and non-WEIRD thinkers 
(western, educated, industrialised, rich, democratic)—cf. the white bear case among 
many, many others.  
 
I would remind the reader: I am in no sense a metaphysical relativist—I have argued 
strongly and at length against relativism as applied to truth, and as applied to other 
things besides; but there are limits to absolutism as applied to certain very core 
normative epistemological concepts, and I rather doubt if the line can usefully be held 
at ‘objective’ rationality but surrendered for a subjective notion of justification—at 
least generally, that is, as opposed to some particular, specific, future, dialectical 
purpose. Still, I register the drawing of this distinction as a possibility, and keep my 
options open in regard to future possible debates. 
 
God, Light Doves, and Language-Holidays 
 
Granted then to Peels and others is that one could distinguish a perspectivist 
‘justification’ from an idealized, ‘objective’ rationality. We need an awareness of the 
fact that we can move our success terms in this fashion; but even were we to do so, 
rationality would not (for the reasons given) be a genuinely hypostatised, really 
objective, humanly unbounded ‘God’s Eye View’. It can’t be. It is epistemology we 
                                                                                                                                       
competences in his problem-space you fall—when your survival as a test, is arguably quite 
‘ecologically valid’. I mean nothing more by these remarks than this—that seems enough to me, 
however. Should you be minded to dismiss such considerations, ask yourself specific questions about, 
say the rationality equivalent of what (in the IQ literature) notoriously has involved such issues as the 
application of allegedly ‘culture fair’ measures of intelligence to say the San people (Kalahari 
Bushmen)—as here reported by the strongly and unapologetically hereditarian g theorist of group 
[racial] differences, Richard Lynn (2006: 51): “The three studies of Bushmen by Porteus and Reuning 
give IQs of 48, 62, and 52 and can be averaged to give an IQ of 54. It may be questioned whether a 
people with an average IQ of 54 could survive as hunter-gatherers in the Kalahari desert, and therefore 
whether this can be a valid estimate of their intelligence. An IQ of 54 is at the low end of the range of 
mild mental retardation in economically developed nations [about 0.13% of people score this low in the 
western, decontextualized nations on which IQ tests are typically normed]. This is less of a problem 
than might be thought....”—I think it is quite as much of a problem as might be thought. The San 
people survive as hunter-gatherers in one of the harshest environments on earth, yet we are to believe 
their population average intelligence is equal to what in our societies would be the 13th lowest IQ 
person out of ten thousand. Ask yourself what your feelings are towards the arguments which beckon 
(mutatis mutandis) for the San and other such people’s rationality. The San people are genetically the 
oldest and most diverse people on earth. They are also among the most persecuted. The stakes are 
higher than you might think in these debates. 
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are doing here after all. Even an idealised epistemic success term is still an epistemic 
success term. God’s reasons are not reasons for us—if indeed He has reasons in the 
sense used herein (which I doubt). An unbounded agent may be envisaged as being 
omniscient, but it is not easy for me to see how a being unlimited in epistemic power 
could be omnirational, rather than being a putative agent who knows everything 
instantly with no effort and therefore is one to whom the concept ‘rational’ no less 
than the concept ‘irrational’ simply did not apply. Rationality applies to our executive 
functioning—and presumably, that of beings somewhat like us, to whom we may 
attribute executive functioning. It applies to the wise allocation of our limited 
cognitive resources—and the good versus rather than less good operation of said 
resources. One works in working memory (a strictly finite resource), one pays 
attention (attention can only apply to a limited being, and involves great cognitive 
costs), one exhibits ‘mental agility’ involving flexibility of thought and this involves 
specific (considerable) switching costs.18 
 
One uses these (these three families of executive function) to govern their operations 
at the same time as one uses them to think (all executive functioning is incipiently 
metaphilosophical, but some is more metaphilosophical than others, some actually 
governs executive functioning itself at the same time as said executive functioning is 
used to govern first order cognition). These notions only apply to finite beings. There 
is no such thing as attention in a being with infinite cognitive resources, infinitely 
distributed. God does not foveate. There is no such thing as the magic number 7 +/-2 
in a being that has a working memory that is numberless, indeed, a completed infinity, 
of the highest order of cardinality. There is no such thing as a working memory 
simpliciter in such a being.  
 
I don’t think I have more than the surface, chimerical, appearance of a concept of 
rationality that applies to an unlimited being; I fear language may be ‘on holiday’ in 
any such an extension of the concept; but perhaps I am unwise here—I don’t work in 
philosophy of religion, and armed with little more than a knowledge of frontal lobe 
function and a Wittgensteinian catchphrase I do not wish to trespass in an area about 
which I know little. I do think, regarding a neighbouring issue, that deontic normative 
terms make sense only in the context of deontic normative leeway entailments (say 
OIC, or one of its cognates) and in the context of agents who are limited in their 
powers—for them then to be assessed in light of these leeway entailments. If we push 
normative deontic predicates beyond certain conceptual limits then ‘language is on 
holiday’. This is of relevance e.g. to (non-theological) classic ethical and epistemic 
debates about the notion of ‘objective duty’ (whether epistemic or ethical).  
 
The deontic notion of ‘ought’ that applies in epistemology is an essentially agent-
relative notion. If it is made absolute and truly objective, the inaccessibility of such a 
hypostatised notion of epistemic value necessarily separates it from something for 
which the agent may be held responsible, to the point where calling this notion a 
notion of objective ‘obligation’ (‘ought’, ‘duty’) would be irretrievably misleading. 
One’s duty, what one ought to do, is something one is responsible for. To place a 
‘duty’ upon one that one is yet not responsible for fulfilling, or perhaps is 
‘responsible’ for ‘fulfilling’ but blamelessly unable to fulfil, is to place no duty upon 
                                                
18 Miyake and Friedman (2012), Friedman and five authors (2008) developed the now widely used 
taxonomy of executive functions into these three families: Shifting (‘flexibility’), Updating (‘Working 
Memory’) and Inhibition. All are strictly limited cognitive resources. 
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one in any ordinary sense. Talk of ‘objective’, ‘absolute’ obligations, duties and the 
like came in to epistemology at least with Chisholm (1957) and Alston (1985) but is 
infelicitous. Since we cannot be held responsible for acting or failing to act on these 
‘obligations’—cannot be obliged to act on them, etc.— they are then not obligations, 
duties, oughts, in anything like the ordinary sense: We see an example of apparently 
deontic terms being stretched far beyond what the interconnected deontic conceptual 
framework actually permits (we see these stretched to the point where they become 
‘superlative oughts’).  
 
The objective, absolute, contrast to Chisholm’s subjective, practical, terms of 
requirement, would then be better not put in terms of ‘duties’, ‘obligations’, ‘oughts’ 
and the like at all. Talk of objective, absolute, ‘obligations’, ‘duties’, etc. should 
tacitly be read as occurring within ‘scare-quotes’—one should mean by it: objective, 
absolute, epistemic value, but not ‘duty’. Material on the Right versus the Good is 
centrally relevant here also. Consequentialist theories in ethics are those which reduce 
the Right to the Good (deontic theories oppose this). By parity of reasoning, I would 
argue that language of this nature when encountered in epistemology should give us 
pause, and urge a radical re-thinking of the extent to which we continue to use talk 
like Chisholm’s, of “the absolute sense of ‘right’”—talk which is widely found in 
ethical debate as well. No such sense of ‘right’ can be sustained, I claim. The Good 
alone can be absolute, the Right alone can be practical. To pick an example from 
Chisholm (1957, 6) It would have been Good not Bad (sans phrase) had Hitler been 
killed as an infant. His nurse though, would have been Wrong not Right (sans phrase) 
to have smothered the infant. 
 
Objective and Subjective Truth-Conduciveness; Regulative and Theoretical; 
Epistemology of Epistemology vs Metaphysics of Epistemology 
 
Nottelmann (2016, 13) on “good epistemic reasons”: 
 
Concerning [“good epistemic reasons”] I propose that at least initially 
we follow BonJour’s lead and unpack this notion in terms of truth 
conduciveness. In BonJour’s preferred words, good epistemic reasons 
offer a relevant subject “at least some chance of finding the truth”... 
 
Following BonJour’s lead, relative to a situation, we may then take a 
good epistemic reason for S to believe/disbelieve p to be an epistemic 
reason, such that, should S in that situation come to believe what the 
epistemic reason indicates, S would then have a fairly high chance of 
believing the truth concerning p ... 
 
Umm... this is a strong statement of things Nottelmann holds to be true, but it appears 
to ride roughshod over much of what is in dispute here—it threatens to be advancing a 
strong externalism regarding “good epistemic reasons” (an account based upon actual 
rather than expected truth conduciveness) by stipulation (see remarks on Alston “what 
the facts available to me” above). As an account of epistemic normativity, actual as 
opposed to expected truth conduciveness has its area of core strength when we 
consider knowledge rather than epistemic justification. An initial, ‘softening up’ 
objection to taking this objective, externalist, theoretical state as the basis for one’s 
account of “good epistemic reasons” tout court may then be made vivid with esoterica 
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such as the ‘new evil demon problem’. Consider a subject who is a brain in a vat, or 
the victim of an evil demon. We recognise that these subjects cannot, for the most 
part, have knowledge—at least, since they will lack truth. But there is a venerable 
internalist tradition holding that such envisaged subjects could be rational (Foley 
2001, 38; 2004, 69; Weatherson 2008, 564-5; Williamson 2007, 182-3; but see 
Nottelmann 2013).19 Likewise for Alston’s tribesman who is brought up to be 
deferential to a spurious authority, and all other perspectival limitations. One is dealt 
the cognitive hand one is dealt, and if this be a poor hand it may deny one the 
possibility of knowledge; but there is a vital sense of “good epistemic reasons” that 
has to do with how well one plays the cards one is dealt, be these good or bad.20 
 
Nottelmann however, follows the previous passages with the following, the first 
sentence of which I think is a good and important point, (the second I take to be over-
dismissive of the severity of the problems that the empirical literature present us 
with):  
 
The above conception of a good epistemic reason [externalist: in terms 
of objective truth conduciveness] allows us to enforce an appearance-
reality distinction and separate epistemic reasons that are really good 
(relative to a subject and a situation) from those that are only 
apparently so. The only bit of proper empirical psychology we need 
now add to the mix is the seemingly plausible thesis that sometimes 
subjects cannot help forming beliefs based on what appears to them to 
be good epistemic reasons, even if those reasons are not really good 
ones (Nottelmann 2016, 13). 
 
Nottelmann is right to say that an unconstrained epistemology, one in which there was 
no separation between “really good (relative to a subject and a situation) from those 
that are only apparently so”, would be utterly unacceptable. But I have already 
defended the view that the positions advanced by Lockie (or Foley, or Clifford, or 
Chisholm, Descartes, Locke and the whole of the deontological tradition) are 
committed to no such elision—if Nottelmann is opposed to these latter this must be 
defended on other grounds.  
 
The example from Alston considered already is a simple and elegant case in 
miniature: a distinction between the case where I believe because of an “egotistical 
penchant to overestimate my powers” versus where one where I believe following a 
course of stringent intellectual auditing that leads me to sincerely take myself to have 
discharged my epistemic obligations. This is a miniature for larger philosophical 
                                                
19 Of course, not if, by stipulation of the thought experiment, the demon is held able to manipulate the 
envatted agent’s active thought processes—his decision-making, his erstwhile, hitherto seen-as, 
executive functioning. We know that one can impair individuals epistemically in suchlike ways without 
appeal to recherché thought experimentation. But if our demon merely manipulates appearances—say, 
the sensory inputs to said agent (that is, if the envatted brain, by hypothesis really has powers of 
cognitive agency, really is an agent)—then my points stand: he (our brain) can be rational. 
20 One may take a ‘factive turn’ and re-terminologise ‘epistemic reason’, ‘justification’ etc. as terms of 
art that cease to be possessed unless certain (proprietary) external specifications are met. I find this a 
familiar, but uninteresting, move. The terms for being as justified as one can make oneself, as justified 
as one may be held responsible for, for scrutinising as well as one is able those justifiers that one has 
reason to believe one possesses will simply have to be resurrected, regardless of terminology. 
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accounts to be found throughout the long, distinguished, history of epistemic 
deontology 
 
if I abstain from giving my judgement on any thing when I do not 
perceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I 
act rightly. . . But if I determine to deny or affirm, I no longer make 
use as I should of my free will, and if I affirm what is not true, it is 
evident that I deceive myself; even though I judge according to truth, 
this comes about only by chance, and I do not escape the blame of 
misusing my freedom; for the light of nature teaches us that the 
knowledge of the understanding should always precede the 
determination of the will. And it is in the misuse of the free will that 
the privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error is met 
with (Descartes 1931, 176).21  
 
I act (epistemically) rightly if I determine to withhold judgement when things are not 
clear and distinct, where I fail to do this, even if I light on the truth (à la BonJour’s 
Clairvoyant) I do not escape blame. As Descartes points up, the attribution of blame 
presupposes free will. Locke says: 
 
Faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, 
as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything, but upon good reason; 
and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes, without having any 
reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither 
seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due his maker, who 
would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to 
keep him out of mistake and error. He that does not this to the best of 
his power, however he sometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by 
chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident will 
excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he 
must be accountable for any mistakes he runs into; whereas he that 
makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, and seeks 
sincerely to discover truth, by those helps and abilities he has, may 
have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that 
though he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it. For he 
governs his assent right, and places it as he should, who in any case or 
matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves, according as reason directs 
him. He that does otherwise, transgresses against his own light and 
misuses those faculties, which were given him (Locke 1975, IV, xvii, 
24). 
 
The distinction between axiological appearance and reality is not in any way effaced 
by the deontically internalist tradition—not even the strongly access-limited versions 
of that tradition—and attempts to argue or assume otherwise will, I believe, tend to be 
based upon the assumption that there cannot be real cognitive freedom (real freedom 
simpliciter) in the world. If you want that assumption you will have to argue for it on 
its own merits. With a strong enough notion of cognitive freedom and self-mastery in 
                                                
21 This and the next (Locke) quotation are much cited—notably by Foley (1993), Plantinga (1993) and 
Feldman (2002). 
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the regulation of my mental life, the distinction between appearance (of good 
epistemic reasons) and reality thereof proceeds just as the greatest author of this 
tradition asserted it did: if “I no longer make use as I should of my free will, and if I 
affirm what is not true, it is evident that I deceive myself; even though I judge 
according to truth, this comes about only by chance, and I do not escape the blame of 
misusing my freedom”. If, however, I do make use as I should of my free will, only 
then to be helplessly unable thereby to achieve the truth—perhaps because of a 
situation of grave epistemic poverty—then I am Locke’s agent who “though he should 
miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it”. 
 
There are objective and subjective notions of epistemic value operative in 
epistemology, each seeking to answer to a different desideratum of adequacy 
(theoretical and regulative—Lockie 2014a). Emphasise a humanly unattainable truth-
conducivity too much (that is, eliminatively—to the wholesale exclusion of the 
subjectively attainable) and you are no longer doing epistemology: you are doing 
metaphysics. In the context of a discussion of Lockie’s paper; it is worth noting that 
there these issues were already discussed: 
 
The deontic understanding of justification, plus the ought-implies-can 
principle, leads to the threat of being never able to convict an agent of 
being unjustified, even when he is radically awry, should he or she 
merely be unable to apprehend the fact that he or she is mistaken. The 
solution to this problem for the internalist is to mark a distinction 
between “absolute” and “practical” justification—between fulfilment 
of “objective” and “subjective” duties. To escape the epistemic poverty 
objection, deontic, oughts-based justification must be restricted in its 
application to the “subjective”, “practical” realm. There is another, 
“objective”, “absolute”, sense of being justified for which the 
discharge of duty, the fulfilment of obligations, be we ever so diligent, 
is not guaranteed to satisfy. So, consider when Goldman says  
 
“I shall assume that only right epistemic rules make a 
difference to genuine justifiedness. This point should be 
equally acceptable to both internalism and externalism” 
(Goldman 2009, 5–6).  
 
This point will be “equally acceptable to both internalism and 
externalism” only should this statement be read by each under a 
different interpretation of “right epistemic rule”. For the internalist, 
this means subjectively right; for the externalist, objectively right. 
[F.N. 5] Argument at cross purposes beckons if we do not keep this in 
mind  (Lockie 2015: 3). 
 
Endnoted at this passage is N. 5 
 
Lockie N. 5: Goldman subsequently considers the application of his 
interpretation of this principle to a specimen “rightness criterion” from 
the internalist camp—and he chooses as his specimen Richard Foley. 
He objects that the subjectivism of a “Foley Rationality” approach 
“makes Foley’s approach ill suited to the objectivist, nonrelativistic 
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spirit of our entire framework” (Goldman 2009, 28). But this section 
has argued that such a subjectivism (such an “internalist 
perspectivism”) is and must be a feature of any clear-headed internalist 
account. What then becomes of Goldman’s claim that “this point 
should be equally acceptable to both internalism and externalism”? 
Against an internalist of Foley’s stamp, I’d suggest that this comes 
worryingly close to begging the question (Lockie 2015, 13). 
 
Nottelmann’s point, drawing on (late) BonJour for support, is just the point which 
Goldman is here noted to be making, and as for Goldman, this point is not “equally 
acceptable to both internalism and externalism”—excepting where each is allowed to 
pun on “right epistemic rules” (Goldman) or “good epistemic reasons” (Nottelmann). 
As I note: “For the internalist, this means subjectively right; for the externalist, 
objectively right”. 
 
Turning to Nottelmann’s specific, semi-regimented arguments: in particular his first 
argument; I would mainly be concerned with his premises 1 and 2.  They seem to sum 
up where we differ. 
 
1. In order for a subject S to be epistemically justified in believing a proposition 
p in some situation C, S’s belief that p must be supported by good epistemic 
reasons for S to believe p in C;  
 
2. [BonJour-style understanding of epistemic reason-goodness] In order for a 
reason to be a good epistemic reason for S to believe p in C, in C S must have 
a fairly high chance of believing the truth concerning p, should she believe as 
the reason indicates (Nottelmann 2016, 14). 
 
Regarding 1: I concur, but note what is already obvious from my paper and from a 
vast epistemic literature (one adverted to in my paper and notably also in my 2014a): 
“good epistemic reasons for S to believe p in C” is an agent-relative (and 
circumstance-relative) notion—an attenuated, access-restricted notion. In order for a 
subject S to be [deontically] epistemically justified in believing a proposition p in 
some situation C, S’s belief that p must be supported by [subjectively, practically, 
regulatively] good epistemic reasons for S to believe p in C. Of course, 1. is also (but 
separately) true should the reader (contra Peels, Alston, and myself) want to employ 
the locution of ‘objectively epistemically justified’ (that is, the notion of the 
epistemically Good rather than Right, an idealized, externalist, theoretical, absolute, 
non-directive notion of epistemic success). Then we have simply used the conjunction 
of words in 1. to make a different statement. Then, we can say in order for a subject S 
to be [externalistically] epistemically ‘justified’ in believing a proposition p in some 
situation C, S’s belief that p must be supported by [objectively, theoretically, non-
regulatively] good epistemic ‘reasons’ for S to believe p in C. (I have ‘problematised’ 
such a notion of reified ‘reasons’ already—hence the scare-quotes around such an 
‘objective justification’, but let it stand). 
 
Turn now to 2. I have already stated that I don’t accept a [late—not early] “BonJour-
style understanding of epistemic reason-goodness”—excepting when the punning on 
the understanding of epistemic ‘reason’-goodness already indicated in 1. is taking 
place. The only way that 2. goes through is if we qualify to the claim that “In order for 
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a reason to be an objectively good ‘reason’ it must be objectively truth conducive”. 
Properly qualified, as hundreds of years of deontic epistemology (and ethics) indicate 
they should be, 1 and 2 cannot begin to get Nottelmann the conclusion he seeks.  
 
But why shouldn’t we ride roughshod over the internalist here? After all, one seeks 
truth doesn’t one? Vahid joins Nottelmann in claiming “there seems to be something 
essentially right about the claim that our concept of justification is sensitive to the 
truth conducivity of the grounds of beliefs” (Vahid 2016, 16). Some of what seems 
“essentially right about the claim that our concept of justification is sensitive to the 
truth conducivity of the grounds of beliefs” just pertains to what I have called the 
‘halo effect’ deriving from one massively important source notion in normative 
epistemology (objective truth conduciveness), applying as it does, to knowledge, only 
then smearing over to another massively important source notion in normative 
epistemology—epistemic justification, ‘good epistemic reasons’ and the like22. The 
externalist stance Vahid, Nottelmann & Goldman adopt here goes back to Alston at 
least: 
 
Of course if I am to carry out the activity of justifying a belief, I must 
provide an argument for it; I must say something as to why one should 
suppose it to be true. ... In saying what reasons there are for supposing 
that p, I am expressing other beliefs of mine and contextually implying 
that I am justified in accepting them. But this all has to do with the 
activity of justifying a belief, showing it to be justified (Alston 1989, 
197-8). 
 
Alston is here marking a distinction between two things. The first is the metaphysics 
of justification, a belief’s state of being justified—to the extent it is. The second is 
variously glossed as the epistemology of justification (“reasons ... for supposing”); the 
activity of justifying (“showing...”); and the pragmatics of that activity (that it 
“contextually implies” that I accept, hence have internalist access-to, my reasons). 
 
Alston is saying that externalism is being put forward as an account of the 
metaphysics of justification—what it is to be justified. It is not put forward as an 
account of the epistemology of justification—how we can show or tell that we are 
justified. He concedes that the project of finding out if one is justified, the activity of 
justifying, and the pragmatic implications of arguing for a claim’s being justified, all 
                                                
22 I repudiate ‘conceptual analysis’ in epistemology for lots of reasons; but in no small part because of 
what I have labelled (after Thorndike and the social-cognitive psychologists) the role of ‘halo effects’ 
in this kind of theory-building (Lockie 2014a, 2014b). Ask yourself what characteristics you think 
justification or knowledge or rationality should have. Introspect on this matter from your armchair. 
Consult your intuitions (perhaps: you ‘deepest intuitions’, perhaps your immediate, pre-analytic, prior 
or primitive intuitions) and interrogate your intuitions with thought experiments. Before you know it 
you’ve lobbed in every pro-attitude success-term even vaguely in the vicinity of normative 
epistemology. Normative pro-attitude terms smear from one success-state to another in these 
unconstrained atomistic armchair meanderings. Should epistemic justification involve (one assumes: an 
objective) “sensitivity to the truth” / “objective truth-conduciveness”? Oh yes! My intuitions would 
revolt against any claim or imagined thought experiment to the contrary! Should knowledge involve 
(one assumes: a subjective, internalistic) notion of justification? Oh yes! My intuitions would revolt 
against any claim or imagined thought experiment to the contrary! I develop careful, considered 
remarks about metaphilosophy in general and meta-epistemology in particular in Lockie (2014a, and 
especially 2014b).  
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(“of course”) require internalism. But to urge this against externalism is an epistemic 
(or pragmatic) non sequitur: externalism is a metaphysical thesis. 
 
From the fact that I can justify a belief only by relating it to other 
beliefs that constitute a support, it does not follow that a belief can be 
justified only by its relations to other beliefs. Analogously, from the 
fact that I cannot justify my expenses without saying something in 
support of my having made them, it does not follow that my expenses 
cannot be justified unless I say something in support of my having 
made them  (Alston 1989, 197-8). 
 
Goldman, in the context of discussing another Alston paper, notes approvingly: “this 
just shows that being justified cannot be equated with having a justification” 
(Goldman 2009, 29). Although Alston is the figure who is rightly most cited for 
drawing this distinction, it is a move now very widely deployed in epistemology, with 
a good appraisal of it being offered by Leite (2004). Leite calls this the ‘spectatorial 
conception’ of justification—inasmuch as one’s justificatory status is something 
entirely extrinsic to one’s knowledge of, or beliefs about, or activity in regard to that 
status: it is something one may ‘spectate’ in activities extrinsic to and dissociated 
from that justificatory status itself.  
 
One’s justificatory status itself and as such is an entirely theoretical state, one’s 
knowledge of, or beliefs about, or efforts to work towards that status (say, through 
active, agential, executive cognition) is a wholly distinct, extrinsic, regulative, issue. 
It appears to be just this move that Nottelmann makes in the passage from him cited 
above, talking of a “conception of a good epistemic reason allows us to enforce an 
appearance-reality distinction and separate epistemic reasons that are really good 
(relative to a subject and a situation) from those that are only apparently so” 
(Nottelmann 2016, 13).  
 
Nottelmann, Goldman, Alston et al.—all who embrace this ‘spectatorial conception’ 
of justification—are drawing a metaphysics (“reality”, “reasons that are really good”) 
versus epistemology (“appearance”, “those that are only apparently so”) within 
epistemology, indeed, within the epistemology of ‘reasons’. Drawing an 
epistemology-metaphysics distinction is normally a benign realist move in philosophy 
(I have strongly realist sympathies myself). But we are within epistemology here: we 
are within the domain of ‘appearances’, indeed, we are within the domain concerned 
with the epistemology of ‘reasons’. We can apply an epistemology-metaphysics 
distinction within epistemology, granted (we can be as iterative—unkindly, one might 
say ‘regressive’—as you like) but we are concerned with epistemic justification here, 
we are concerned with ‘appearances’, with the normative epistemology of what the 
old British philosophers of language called ‘warranted assertability’; with justified 
belief where this has not been hypostatised, transformed and transmogrified into 
something metaphysical.  
 
When is the agent epistemically justified? That means: when, from the agent’s 
perspective, are the appearances indicative of truth (not, when, from the perspective 
of one in the know—God, or a Victorian Anthropologist, or a ‘London School’ g 
theorist, or an absolutist, etic, decontextualized cognitive scientist—are they really 
flags of truth). If you choose the latter, spectatorial, stance, why not cut the 
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epistemology altogether, and just stick to the metaphysics? We may passively possess 
a certain (externalist) epistemic status, but then again, we may possess a certain 
alethic status (Chisholm 1988, 287ff; 1989, 77ff, Plato: Meno, Theaetetus) the project 
of epistemology precisely takes its point of departure from the commonplace that 
axiologically, mere possession of a certain metaphysical status is not enough.  
 
Epistemological Humility (The Psychologists and Anthropologists are Actually 
Quite Bright) 
 
The psychologists working on rationality (not more generally, however) are in many 
instances remarkably philosophically sophisticated. Psychology, moreover, can give 
lessons as well as take them: it is a highly developed discipline in its own right. The 
Vygostkian literature is just one (striking) literature indicating that rationality is 
significantly, radically, ‘culture laden’—and not merely culture-laden at the 
periphery, as it were, but at its core. Thus, the Chomskian competence-performance 
distinction, as adapted by L. J. Cohen, though very worthwhile, and though capable of 
accounting for some of the variance, is quite incapable of accounting for it all; and 
pace Elqayam, I never thought it could.  
 
I am not sure, however, whether many traditionally educated epistemologists 
appreciate this to the extent they might. So, the cultural-psychological and 
anthropological literatures do not need armchair assistance from the philosopher 
(myself or any other) indicating that such phenomena as Luria’s ‘white bear’ 
syllogism permit of easy solution in terms of a surface performance error and a deeper 
logical competence (or incompetence—I could not always tell which position was 
being attributed to me or endorsed by my respondents in their own right)—I am not 
seeking to offer any such armchair assistance, and I would caution anyone against 
offering such.  
 
Such problematic empirical phenomena do not permit of any easy ‘conceptual’ 
solution—as, say, for example, in terms of front-end culture-fair measurement 
solutions (Luria-Vygotsky, Cole et al were and are extremely culture-fair, pace 
Nottelmann’s (2016, 18-19) otherwise rather attractive ‘Gorilla-weightlifting’ 
example, which in any event I take to be a major concession to my view that 
contextualized thinkers are epistemically justified/rational). The aprioristic 
epistemological tradition should give itself some familiarity with the nature of the 
cognitive psychological, cultural psychological and anthropological literatures here.  
 
The problems cultural psychologists have uncovered (and they are legion—the ‘white 
bear’ syllogism is merely an exemplar, a placeholder for many such cases in these 
literatures) do not permit of any facile, dismissive, ‘conceptual’ solution. Such cases 
indicate real, serious, deep cognitive differences between contextualized and 
decontextualized humans—including contextualized humans who may nevertheless 
be fine thinkers. Most humans that have ever lived (including some, doubtless, with 
the genetic potential of a Gödel, an Aristotle or a Kant) have been contextualized 
cognisers. Deciding what we say of their rationality (or epistemic justification, or 
epistemic poverty) is a genuinely vexed question. 
 
Contact details: bob@lockie.f9.co.uk 
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